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I. Introduction
In the long run the enforceability of investor rights may go hand in hand with the attractiveness of the respective capital market. That is why collective redress for retail This legislative history already highlights the essential economic background of the statute, laying the foundation for its specific regulatory significance. Since in the
Telekom-case the sheer number of claims could have threatened the enforcement of the underlying regulation within reasonable timeframe, the model case procedure as provided for by the German Capital Markets Model Case Act is supposed to be a means to aggregate, to a certain degree, small individual claims. 5 As such it aims to promote judicial efficiency and to reduce the risk of inconsistent adjudications in the same or very similar cases. This brings into focus the tension these model case procedures under the KapMuG are subject to: the tension between individual investor protection and the regulatory goal of "regulation through litigation" 6 .
At the same time, this over-arching leitmotif of model case procedures may serve as the guideline for the following analysis of the question in how far the German KapMuG This approach was adopted and further specified by the European Parliament in its resolution "Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress", in which it
proposes "… a horizontal framework including a common set of principles providing uniform access to justice via collective redress within the EU and specifically but not exclusively dealing with the infringement of consumers' rights…" 14 In addition to the regulatory significance of collective redress, the European Parliament also clarifies the method how to achieve it by providing in its resolution the "…need to take due account of the legal traditions and legal orders of the individual Member States…" character, their main objective should be directly related to the rights granted under Union law that are claimed to have been violated and they should have sufficient capacity in terms of financial resources, human resources, and legal expertise.
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The necessary link between substantive law and regulatory infrastructure leads to a considerable importance and potential difficulty of the right choice of the entity granted standing to bring a representative action. 28 This may to some degree explain why group actions are the more common collective redress mechanism and available in Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK (England and Wales). Collective redress by sectors in Germany Germany also follows a sectoral approach in the field of collective redress, so that one has to differentiate among the mechanisms procedural law has to offer according to the specific law and redress that is sought. 44 The oldest and most common collective redress mechanism is the association or interest group complaint (Verbandsklage), whose rules fact that the number of representative group action cases is higher and increasing. 54 The latter's scope of application is quite broad and has included the misleading prospectus by market introduction of World Online 55 and securities 56 cases.
Even so, the prominence of the enumerated WCAM-cases indicates that these settlements may be gaining in popularity and for financial institutions collective actions may indeed act as an incentive to enter into a settlement. 57 In order for this line of reasoning to work, the settlement under WCAM provides for a procedural novelty, that is the opt-out approach. As a result, the settlements negotiated by investors associations have a binding effect on all investors similarly situated, except for those who declare to "opt-out". 58 A 2012 amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure may also boost collective settlements, admitting questions to be immediately submitted to the Supreme Court by courts, if directly relevant to the case. 59 It is true that this amendment applies not only to class settlements, but to any situation of a greater number of claims based on the same or similar factual or legal issues. In light of the fast clarification of questions of law to be expected from the Supreme Court, it may induce parties to settle and pave the way for an expansion of the settlement system.
Apart from this enlarged potential range for settlements, the Dutch legislator has also widened their scope of potential application in an Act of June 26, 2013, amending the Dutch Collective Settlements Act, which extends the latter's applicability to bankruptcy cases and the introduction of a pre-trial hearing. 60 The latter can be requested by either party to find out whether a settlement is viable. Thus incentives to settle are created early on. Since a party failing to discharge his obligation to appear may be charged with the costs of the parties that appear, on this occasion, the opt-out mechanism can produce additional effects. Therefore overall, as a result of the Amendment the regulatory interest in a far-reaching settlement of a mass damage situation compels individual class members to opt out at an earlier stage of the litigation, if they disapprove of the settlement. German civil procedure and the resulting procedural problems to bundle the underlying claims that belong to different claimants. Accordingly, these are the issues that shape the current German legal debate in this field.
Model case procedures

III. The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) of 2005 and its amendment of 2012
A. Capital markets model cases -practical experience and empirical findings It stands to reason that the significant role of individual procedural rights brings about distinct limits to collective litigation mechanisms. As a result, when it comes to retail investor protection, in the German two-tier legal framework for the provision of investment services hand in hand with its implementation via civil liability in courts goes its public enforcement by supervisory authorities. 73 On the EU-level the potential divergence between the enforcement of the MiFID and investor enforcement of good behavior by investment firms becomes evident, civil liability regimes and procedural mechanisms in this field falling within the legislative power of the Member States. 74 This broadening, however, comes at a price for potential claimants. At first glance, this amendment seems to finally subject the same facts of retail investor disputes to a coherent and comprehensive set of procedural rules, thus possibly avoiding inconsistent decisions. 82 At the same time, the inclusion of these claims may lead to a stay of the proceedings in the individual lawsuit of a retail investor where the trial court finds of its own motion that the decision will depend on the declaratory judgment as desired in the model case procedure ( § 8 of the German Model Case Act 2012). As a result, the individual claimant will find himself to be part of a mass litigation and subject to the delays this will entail. This sheds some light on the problems arising from the way an individual may be forced into a model case under the KapMuG leaving it by and large to the judgment of the courts whether to stay an individual lawsuit with a view to a pending model case. 83 Critics point out resulting unnecessary delays which may be in conflict with Art. 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. 84 This is why there is the proposition to replace this approach with an opt-in or opt-out mechanism as it is common in other jurisdictions.
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C. The three-tier procedure of a model case procedure Even though a model case procedure is marked by its adversarial structure involving two parties, its main characteristics indicate some regulatory control over the progress of the proceedings and a certain tension between these two different procedural principles. 86 The initiative to file a petition for a model case decision is left to the parties, it can be either the plaintiff or the defendant to file such a petition in a case pending before the trial court. 87 Once the sufficiency of the motion is approved, the (KapMuG) that provides for a transition of the control over the proceeding to the higher regional court. 89 Notwithstanding this improvement serious delays and inefficiencies still result from the plaintiffs' right unlimited in time to submit a motion to extend the scope of the determination in the model case procedure, which seems to be one of the greatest obstacles to a rapid and reliable conduct of the model case procedure. 90 Once the model case is before the higher regional court, the court selects of its own Looking at the model case procedure as a whole, there is no denying the fact that it struggles with the frictions that result from the partial collectivization of claims. The latter may come into conflict with some basic principles of German civil procedure forming the foundation for the adversarial system, in particular the principle of party disposition. According to the latter it is for the parties to delimit the subject-matter of the proceedings. 94 In light of the final definition and formulation of the legal issues to be subjected to the model case decision in the order for reference to the higher regional court issued by the trial court, it is clear that the parties' control is largely restricted.
This goes even further, considering the higher regional court's selection of the lead plaintiff that is therefore also removed from party control.
D. Notification of claims and individual lawsuits
In addition, the parties' control over legal proceedings under this general principle also extends to the parties' common agreement when to initiate the proceeding and when to end it. This raises the question how plaintiffs can join a model case procedure after its initiation. The model case decision by the higher regional court is binding for the individual lawsuits whose proceedings have been stayed and are continued afterwards.
In order to fully participate in the model case procedure in such a way, a retail investor has, of course, to file an individual lawsuit to begin with. This is particularly true because the regular limitation periods for claims based on issuer liability because of incorrect ad-hoc notification are relatively short, that is one year only pursuant to § 37b, 37c of the German Securities Trading Act. 95 If a plaintiff now wants to avoid the limitation of his claims and at the same time participate in the effect of the model case procedure, each and every plaintiff will have to file a conventional lawsuit. This would then add to the above-mentioned congestion of the courts. 96 On the other hand, such a litigation strategy may turn out to be irrational for the individual claimant because of high litigation costs. 97 The latter include a share of the costs of the overall model case procedure proportionate to the claim in relation to the total amount of claims ( § 24 para. 1 and 2 of the German Model Case Act of 2012
[KapMuG]). This applies for example to costs arising from the collection of evidence and inquiries the claimant did not initiate or in any way control and he would therefore not have asked for in his individual lawsuit. 98 In any case, he is forced into the model case procedure for the reasons stated above in order to ensure to be able to ultimately 
IV. Summary
The German Model Case Procedure Act can be characterized by its main goals to improve individual investor protection by facilitating the enforcement of individual claims, to facilitate the enforcement of capital market regulation, and to reduce the burden on the judicial system. 107 These goals could not all be fully achieved at once with the German Model Case Procedure Act of 2005, as has become apparent on the occasion of the first cases, namely the Telekom-case to be litigated in such a procedure.
These goals are, however, the criteria to focus on, when it comes to evaluating the latest amendment of this act in 2012. Besides improving investor protection, this enlarged scope of application may also subject an individual claimant to a mass litigation and the possibly resulting delays and limitations of his procedural rights.
The German model case procedure is characterized by a three-tier procedure, starting from the petition for a model case decision in the trial court, leading to the resolution of the legal issues raised in the petition by the higher regional court and going back to the individual lawsuits before the trial courts. The sometimes procedurally time-consuming ping-pong match between the lower and the higher court produced long delays and proved to be very inefficient at times. That is why the amendment has tried to improve the conduct of the proceedings in order to accelerate the model case procedure and to enhance its efficiency. Even so, these changes have not eased the overall friction between the procedural needs necessarily arising from the bundling of individual claims and the regulatory goals sometimes lurking behind them.
The newly introduced notification of claims does not amount to a full-fledged opt-in mechanism, but only suspends the limitation of claims. Therefore the participation threshold is not effectively lowered and enforcement will not increase notably. As far as the new opt-out settlement under the amendment of the German Model Case Act of 2012 is concerned, one has to note that both regulatory interests as well as individual investor interests enter into it. This shows in the necessary court approval from which no appeal shall lie, but which can be invalidated by an opt-out of at least 30% of the joined parties, who can also opt-out on their own in order to avoid participation.
The remaining shortcomings and compromises of the amendment led the Green Party to present a reform proposal in the German Bundestag that aimed to replace the German Model Case Procedure Act with a universal group procedure act applicable to all civil and commercial matters in June 2013. 108 No ordinary filing of a lawsuit would be necessary anymore and there would be opt-in possibilities in order to keep costs low and eliminate participation thresholds. 109 At the same time, opt-out mechanisms were rejected because of the potential binding effect of the later decision on disagreeing parties against their will, if they fail to opt-out explicitly. 110 Not surprisingly, the proposal ultimately only had symbolic status resulting from the subsequent general elections, which did not provide the Greens with the necessary votes necessary in
